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THE DOCTRINE OF HISTORIC BAYS: APPLYING AN
ANACHRONISM IN THE ALABAMA AND
MISSISSIPPI BOUNDARY CASE
Since its inception in 1953, the Submerged Lands Act has given
rise to numerous disputes between the federal government and the
coastal states. Recently, the Supreme Court ruled that the States
of Mississippi and Alabama owned title to Mississippi Sound
based on the doctrine of historic bays. The soundness of this deci-
sion is questionable considering the imprecise nature of the
doctrine.
INTRODUCTION
On February 26, 1985, the United States Supreme Court decided
United States v. Louisiana (Alabama and Mississippi Boundary
Case).1 This case highlights a series of disputes between the federal
government and coastal states over ownership of subsoil and subsur-
face resources beneath the navigable waters within national bounda-
ries.2 The question of ownership seemed unimportant until the ad-
vent of offshore oil wells. Today, the primary interest of the parties
focuses upon the potential tax revenue derived from oil and natural
gas leases granted to private firms for offshore exploitation.
Prior to 1953, the Supreme Court held that rights to coastal sub-
surface resources vested exclusively in the federal government.
1. United States v. Louisiana, 105 S. Ct. 1074 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Ala-
bama and Mississippi Boundary Case].
2. See United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139 (1965); United States v. Loui-
siana, 394 U.S. 1 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Texas Boundary Case]; United States v.
Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Louisiana Boundary Case]; United
States v. Alaska, 422 U.S. 184 (1975); United States v. Florida, 425 U.S. 791 (1976).
3. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947). The Court in a subsequent
decree stated:
The United States of America is now, and has been at all times pertinent
hereto, possessed of paramount rights in, and full dominion and power over, the
lands, minerals and other things underlying the Pacific Ocean lying seaward of
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However, in 1953, Congress enacted the Submerged Lands Act
(SLA), effectively overruling the Supreme Court's position. 4 The
purpose of the SLA is outlined in its title:
To conform and establish the titles of the States to lands beneath navigable
waters within state boundaries and to the natural resources within such
lands and waters, to provide for the use and control of said lands and re-
sources, and to confirm the jurisdiction and control of the United States
over the natural resources of the seabed of the Continental Shelf seaward of
State boundaries.5
Under the SLA, each coastal state owns all submerged lands and
subsurface resources within three miles measured seaward from its
coastline or from the seaward limit of its inland waters.6
The SLA is vague in defining a number of crucial terms, including
"inland waters." In the Alabama and Mississippi Boundary Case,
the Court was called upon to determine whether Mississippi Sound
7
was part of the States' inland waters, or part of the territorial sea.,
As inland waters, the Sound would be delimited, and the adjacent
states of Alabama and Mississippi would own paramount title to the
submerged lands beneath the Sound. If the Court found that the
the ordinary low-water mark on the coast of California, and outside of the
inland waters, extending seaward three nautical miles and bounded on the
north and south, respectively, by the northern and southern boundaries of the
State of California. The State of California has no title thereto or property
interest therein.
332 U.S. at 805.
4. Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (1982). The passage of the
SLA was not without controversy. Many academicians and political leaders were reluc-
tant to disturb the Supreme Court's 1947 California decision. Representative Radwan, of
New York, before the House of Representatives on March 5, 1953, stated:
[Flor the Congress to recognize and confirm a title that the Supreme Court
has six times stated never existed is a most grave encroachment by the legisla-
tive body upon the judicial branch . . . . Present legislation before the Con-
gress is likewise unconstitutional because the Supreme Court has decided that
the rights of the federal government to these offshore lands are paramount.
83rd Cong., Ist Sess. Sec. 9, 99 CONG. REc. A1087 (1953) (statement of Rep. Radwan).
5. 67 Stat. 29 (1953).
6. 43 U.S.C. § 1312.
7. The Mississippi Sound is a body of water directly south of the mainland of
Alabama and Mississippi. The Sound extends from Mobile Bay to Lake Borgne, a dis-
tance of approximately 100 miles. To the south, the Sound is bound by a group of sandy
barrier islands forming part of the Gulf Islands National Seashore. These protective is-
lands, including Isle Au Pitre, Cat Island, Ship Island, Horn Island, Petit Bois Island,
and Dauphin Island all lie approximately 10 miles off the coast. See 19 ENCYCLOPEDIA
AMERICANA 251 (1980).
8. There are three legally distinct zones of navigable sea. First, there is the high
seas, commonly called international waters, which no state may assert jurisdiction over.
Second, there is the territorial sea, which is subject to the sovereignty of a nation but in
which the right of innocent passage is permitted. The territorial sea is a 12-mile limit
adopted by the community of nations. Finally, there is the internal, or inland waters,
which are under the complete dominion and control of a nation. See Louisiana Boundary
Case, 394 U.S. at 22 (1969); see also Comment, Right Title and Interest in the Territo-
rial Sea: Federal and State Claims in the United States, 4 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 463
(1974).
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Sound was part of the territorial sea, the federal government could
claim ownership of a substantial portion of the submerged lands
under the Sound. The Supreme Court, applying the doctrine of his-
toric bays, declared the Sound inland waters.9
This Comment challenges the wisdom of that decision. The doc-
trine of historic bays,10 developed as an international law concept,
remains controversial. Three Law of the Sea Conferences have failed
to develop an acceptable working definition of historic bays.1 As ap-
plied today, the doctrine is based upon the prescriptive rights12 of a
sovereign over a body of water; historic bays are waters claimed by
one coastal sovereign as exclusive maritime territory, following a pe-
riod of continuous and unchalleged use.
1 3
This Comment discusses the application of this doctrine, albeit in-
ternational in flavor, to domestic disputes.14 In addition, this Com-
ment analyzes the cases arising from the SLA, and the historical
development of the delimitation of bays.
Ironically, the victorious litigants, the States of Alabama and Mis-
sissippi both filed Exceptions to the Report of the Special Master' 5
9. Alabama and Mississippi Boundary Case, 105 S. Ct. 1074 (1985).
10. See infra notes 39-83 and accompanying text.
11. See infra note 75 and accompanying text.
12. There are two main forms of prescription: (1) "extinctive prescription," or
loss of a claim by failure to litigate within a reasonable time, and (2) "acquisitive pre-
scription," which means title is acquired through a lapse of time. Our concern here is
primarily with acquisitive prescription. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 7553, 2 DI-
GEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1062 (M. Whiteman ed. 1963).
13.. Historic rights pertain not only to bays, but also to maritime areas which do
not constitute bays, such as the waters of archipelagos, straits, estuaries, and other simi-
lar bodies of water. The term "historic bays" is sometimes referred to as "historic wa-
ters," however, they'are not synonymous, the latter term having a broader scope. None-
theless, the term "historic bays" has been more frequently used to describe historical
rights over a maritime area. See Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, 1951-54: Points of Substantive Law, 1954 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
371, 381.
14. The United States courts may apply international law as their own, in appro-
priate circumstances. Banco Nacional De Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1963).
The Court in Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1899), stated that "[i]nternational law is
part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of
appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly
presented for their determination." See generally Sprout, Theories as to the Applicabil-
ity of International Law in the Federal Courts of the United States, 26 Am. J. INT'L L.
280 (1932).
15. See United States v. Louisiana, Report of Walter P. Armstrong, Jr., Special
Master, April 9, 1984 (October term 1983, No. 9 Original) [hereinafter referred to as
Report of the Special Master]. A Special Master, as a representative of the court, is one
to whom a matter is referred to hear and report his findings of fact and conclusions of
law.
advocating alternative methods of delimitation.'1 The objections of




A bay is a well marked indentation in such proportion to the width
of its mouth that it contains land-locked waters, 8 and which is more
than a mere curvature of the coast.19 A bay may be considered a
port, sound, estuary, fjord, or simply an arm of the sea.20 The size
and shape of a bay depends upon a number of factors including the
geological composition of the surrounding landmass, climatic condi-
tions of the area, past and present glacier activity, presence of river
mouths, and human intervention in the bay environment.2 A bay
has both political and economic importance. Bays provide protection
for maritime activities, facilitate transportation for persons living on
the bay, and may sustain marine life used to supplement the local
food supply.
Over the years, coastal nations have found it necessary to delimit
16. See United States v. Louisiana, Exceptions of the State of Alabama to the
Report of the Special Master, June 26, 1984 (October Term 1983, No. 9 Original)
[hereinafter referred to as Exceptions of the State of Alabama]; and United States v.
Louisiana, Exceptions of the State of Mississippi to the Report of the Special Master,
June 26, 1984 (October Term 1983, No. 9 Original) [hereinafter referred to as Excep-
tions of the State of Mississippi].
17. See United States v. Louisiana, Reply Brief of the United States, August 2,
1984 (October Term 1983, No. 9 Original) [hereinafter referred to as Reply Brief of the
United States]. Counsel for the United States commented:
As the unsuccessful party, we have naturally enough, challenged both rulings
[of the Special Master]. The surprise is that the States [of Alabama and Mis-
sissippi] have also filed Exceptions to the Master's report, together with elabo-
rate supporting arguments. We are perhaps entitled to derive some comfort
from this unusual circumstance. Of course, Alabama and Mississippi are en-
tirely free to quarrel with the Master because he rejected some of their conten-
tions, albeit he reached the same result for other reasons. But one may ask why
those who have prevailed on two arguments insist that they should also win on
as many as three additional grounds. The only apparent explanation is that the
States are not sanguine about the soundness, and therefore the viability, of
their tentative victory if it must rest on the Master's Report.
Id. at 1-2.
18. 1 A. SHALOWITZ, SHORE AND SEA BOUNDARIES 297 (1962). Land-locked wa-
ters are indentations along the coast that are nearly cut off from access to the sea; almost
completely surrounded by land.
19. M. STROHL, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF BAYS 55 (1963).
20. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 7825. 4 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 210
(M. Whiteman ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as 4 Whiteman].
21. The geography of a coastal area is constantly changing. Soil deposits may
reduce the water area in a bay, and erosion or a heavy storm may wash away a headland.
Moreover, a former headland may become an island or an island may completely disap-
pear as a result of a storm. See generally G. MANGONE, LAW FOR THE WORLD OCEAN
1-5 (1981); L. CUYVERS, OCEAN USES AND THEIR REGULATION 2-12 (1984).
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bays to meet the needs of their citizens. Delimitation is the process
of designating and enclosing a body of water as inland (or internal)
waters. This practice, however, illustrates the conflict between two
traditional principles of international law-the territorial jurisdiction
asserted by a coastal nation, and mare liberum, or freedom of the
seas.2 A sovereign enclosing a bay generally asserts complete do-
minion and control over the bay, as if the water body were part of its
land territory. Such jurisdiction prohibits the passage of all vessels.
Since their inception, the international law of bays23 and the practice
of delimitation have evolved and expanded considerably.24 Various
methods which have been developed to delimit bays include the doc-
trine of inter fauces terrarum,25 the "cannon-shot" rule,26 the range
of vision from headland to headland rule,27 the six-mile and ten-mile
22. The doctrine of the "freedom of the seas" generally means that the sea is
equally "free" for all nations to use. Hugo Grotuis, in 1609, coined the term to give
credence to the Dutch right to navigation and commercial activity with the East Indies,
notwithstanding the Portuguese claim to a monopoly. The term, however, over the years
has become a contrivance to permit superpowers to expand their political and economic
control. See generally R. MAGOFFIN. GROTIUS ON THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS (1916).
23. See M. STROHL, supra note 19, at 95. The author discusses the development
of the international law of bays, from the fall of Rome up to the 20th Century; citing
navigation, economics and defense as major influences.
24. Various writers have commented that the proliferation of delimitation is part
of a process called "creeping jurisdiction." This phenomena represents "the extension of
national and international rules and regulations, and rights and duties over and under the
sea, in straits and coastal zones, on and under the seabed, and in vast stretches of the
high seas." See K. BOOTH, LAW, FORCE AND DIPLOMACY AT SEA 38 (1985); see also
Knauss, Creeping Jurisdiction and Customary International Law, 15 OCEAN DEV. &
INT'L L. 209 (1985).
25. 2 H. GRoTIus, DE JURE BELLI AS PACls 209, translated in THE CLASSICS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1925). Inter fauces terrarum, between the jaws of the land, de-
fines a bay as an arm of the sea enclosed between two promontory points. This doctrine,
accepted by the International Court of Justice in Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J.
116 (1951) [hereinafter cited as Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries], considers the relationship
between the bay and the contiguous land mass.
26. The cannon-shot rule represents the maximum effective range of a 19th cen-
tury cannon to determine the limit of territorial waters. This distance is approximately
three miles or one marine league. As weapon technology increased, the rule was discred-
ited. Nonetheless, the rule has been applied in a number of state decrees enclosing bays.
The rule illustrates the importance of defense. See generally T.W. FULTON, THE SOVER-
EIGNTY OF THE SEA 566 (1911); see also P. JEssuP, THE LAW OF TERRITORIAL WATERS
AND MARITIME JURISDICTION 5-8 (1927).
27. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court adopted this rule in Common-
wealth v. Peters, 53 Mass. 387 (1847). The court stated that "[a]ll creeks, havens, coves,
and inlets lying within projecting headlands and islands, and all bays and arms of the sea
lying within and between lands not so wide but that persons and objects on the one side
can be discerned by the naked eye by persons on the opposite side, are taken to be within
the body of the country." Id. at 392. See A. SHALOWITZ, supra note 18, at 29-30.
rules, 28 and the twenty-four mile formulation prescribed by the 1958
Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone
(Territorial Sea Convention).29
The Territorial Sea Convention codifies the international stan-
dards by which sovereigns may assert jurisdiction over such coastal
waters. Article 7 outlines a two-part test by which a bay may be
designated as the inland waters of a coastal nation.30 First, the in-
dentation must meet the semicircle test. That is, the body of water to
be enclosed as a bay must have an area as large, or larger than that
of a semicircle whose diameter is represented by the line joining the
entrance points of the indentation."a The semicircle test assures that
the configuration of the indentation has the characteristics of a bay
and is not a mere curvature of the coast. Second, the maximum dis-
tance between the natural entrance points of the bay cannot exceed
twenty-four nautical miles.3 2 If a body of water meets this two-part
28. For a discussion on the development of the six-mile and ten-mile rules, see M.
STROHL, supra note 19, at 5.
29. Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, 15 U.S.T. 1606,
T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (effective September 10, 1964) [hereinafter cited
as Territorial Sea Convention]. The 24-mile rule is also contained in article 10 of the
1982 United States Convention on the Law of the Sea. The United States, however, is
not a party to this treaty. See infra note 166.
30. Article 7 of the Territorial Sea Convention states:
1. This article relates only to bays the coasts of which belong to a single state.
2. For the purpose of these articles, a bay is a well-marked indentation whose
penetration is in such proportion to the width of its mouth as to contain land-
locked waters and constitute more than a mere curvature of the coast. An in-
dentation, shall not, however, be regarded as a bay unless its area is as large
as, or larger than, that of the semicircle whose diameter is a line drawn across
the mouth of that indentation.
3. For the purpose of measurement, the areas of an indentation is that lying
between the low-water mark around the shore of the indentation and a line
joining the low-water mark of its natural entrance points. Where, because of
the presence of islands, an indentation has more than one mouth, the semicircle
shall be drawn on a line as long as the sum total of the lengths of the lines
across the different mouths. Islands within an indentation shall be included as
if they were part of the water areas of the indentation.
4. If the distance between the low-water marks of the natural entrance points
of a bay does not exceed twenty-four miles, a closing line may be drawn be-
tween these two low-water marks, and the waters enclosed thereby shall be
considered as internal waters.
5. Where the distance between the low-water marks of the natural entrance
points of a bay exceeds twenty-four miles, a straight baseline of twenty-four
miles shall be drawn within the bay in such a manner as to enclose the maxi-
mum area of water that is possible with a line of that length.
6. The foregoing provisions shall not apply to so-called "historic" bays, or in
any case where the straight baseline system provided for in article 4 is applied.
31. Id. art. 7(2).
32. Id. art. 7(4). The 24-mile closing rule represents the theory that the breadth
of a nation's sovereignty over a bay should not exceed twice the distance of its 12 mile
territorial limit. This closing line in respect to the "natural entrance points" is somewhat
relaxed by article 7(5) which allows drawing a closing line within the bay to encompass
the maximum area of water possible. See A. SHALOWITZ, supra note 18, at 222-25.
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test, it is considered a juridical bay. If a body of water fails to meet
this test, a nation may still apply two special exceptions to delimit a
bay."3 The juridical bay rules of article 7 may be circumvented by
applying the straight baseline system provided under article 4,34 or a
body of water may qualify as a bay under the doctrine of historic
bays.
35
Article 4 of the Territorial Sea Convention 6 allows a coastal na-
tion to draw straight baselines in localities where the coastline is
deeply indented or fringed with islands. The drawing of the coast,
and the outlying waters must be sufficiently linked to the land mass
to be considered internal waters.37 This method, in effect, permits a
coastal nation to evade the twenty-four mile closing line rule of arti-
cle 7. However, if a coastal nation applies the straight baseline
method of article 4, it must also grant foreign vessels the right of
innocent passage pursuant to article 5(2).3 This facilitates the free
33. See Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 29, art. 7(6).
34. Article 4 of the Territorial Sea Convention states:
I. In localities where the coast line is deeply indented and cut into, or if there
is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity, the method of
straight baselines joining appropriate points may be employed in drawing the
baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.
2. The drawing of such baselines must not depart to any appreciable extent
from the general direction of the coast, and the sea areas lying within the lines
must be sufficiently closely linked to the land domain to be subject to the re-
gime of internal waters.
3. Baselines shall not be drawn to and from low-tide elevations, unless light-
houses or similar installations which are permanently above sea level have been
built on them.
4. Where the method of straight baselines is applicable under the provisions of
paragraph 1, account may be taken, in determining particular baselines, of eco-
nomic interests peculiar to the region concerned, the reality and the importance
of which are clearly evidenced by long usage.
5. The system of straight baselines may not be applied by a State in such a
manner as to cut off from the high seas the territorial sea of another State.
6. The coastal State must clearly indicate straight baselines on charts, to which
due publicity must be given.
Id. art. 4.
35. Id. See Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 29, art. 7(6). See supra note
30.
36. See Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 29, art. 4(1). See supra note 34.
37. See Territorial Sea Convention supra note 29, art. 4(2). For the text of art.
4(2), see supra note 34. See also Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.) 1951 I.C.J. 116 (1951).
38. Article 5(2) of the Territorial Sea Convention states:
Where the establishment of a straight baseline in accordance with Article 4
has the effect of enclosing as internal waters areas which previously had been
considered as part of the territorial sea or the high seas, a right of innocent
passage, as provided in articles 14 to 23, shall exist in those waters.
Id. art 5(2).
movement of innocent maritime activity while protecting the eco-
nomic and political interests of a sovereign.
The Doctrine of Historic Bays
Definition
The second exception, found in article 7(6), pertains to waters
characterized as historic bays.39 Though not defined by the Territo-
rial Sea Convention, a survey of international scholars establishes
three essential elements for historic bays:
(I) the coastal nation must claim the body of water as within its
sovereignty,
(2) the coastal nation must effectively exercise its sovereignty over a long
period of time, and
(3) there must be a peaceful and continuous exercise of sovereignty at the
acquiescence of foreign nations.'
0
Issues related to the claim requirement concern the scope of the
sovereign's authority, the acts by which this authority is exercised,
and the effectiveness of the sovereign's authority over the body of
water.41 The scope of authority exercised by the State must be com-
mensurate with the claim. With respect to the burden of proof, Pro-
fessor Gidel argued that "[t] he coastal State which makes the claim
of 'historic waters' is asking that they should be given exceptional
treatment; such exceptional treatment must be justified by excep-
tional conditions.' 42 Moreover, this element is satisfied only if the
authority asserted is exercised effectively.'
3
The precise length of time necessary to establish continuity is not
defined. General standards in international law, however, require the
exercise of authority over a period of time sufficient to be considered
usage.' 4 In this context, the term "usage" means a uniform course of
conduct, or a repeated activity by the sovereign in the contested
39. See Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 29, art. 7(6). For the text of arti-
cle 7(6), see supra note 30.
40. L. BOUCHEz, THE INTERNATIONAL REGIME OF BAYS 281 (1964). For a survey
of international legal scholars, see Historic Bays: Memorandum by the Secretariat of the
United Nations, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/1, reprinted in I United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea Official Records 1 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Memorandum by the
Secretariat].
41. Juridical Regime of Historic Waters, Including Historic Bays, [962] 2 Y.B.
INT'L L. COMM'N, 13-14, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/145 [hereinafter referred to as Juridical
Regime].
42. 3 G. GIDEL, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC DE LA MER 635 (1934), quoted
and translated in Juridical Regime, supra note 41, at 7.
43. The effectiveness of authority exercised must "be expressed by deeds and not
merely by proclamations." M. BOURQUIN, LES BAIES HISTORIQUES in MELANGES
GEORGES SAUSER-HALL 41 (1952), quoted and translated in Juridical Regime, supra
note 41, at 15.
44. See Juridical Regime, supra note 41, at 15.
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area. Historical claims made by Norway,45 France,46 India,4 7 and the
United States48 exemplify the requisite period of time. However, it is
a matter of subjective judgment in determining when sufficient time
has elapsed for usage to manifest; it varies according to the facts of
each case.49 With respect to continuity, the Norwegian Government
during the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case stated:
A historic title can never be acquired unless it is supported by long usage.
In such a title, the essential factor is duration. Admittedly, a usage which
has acquired validity with the passage of time must also have been peaceful
and continuous. If it had not been, it would never have acquired validity.
But, as the word itself shows clearly enough, a 'historic' title derives its
force from history, that is to say, from the passage of time.'0
Arguably, historic title does not vest when a coastal nation decides to
assert it. Rather, it gradually ripens when recognized by the commu-
nity of nations after a long and open exercise of sovereignty.
The acquiescence of foreign governments to a coastal nation's as-
sertion of sovereignty is also required to establish a valid historic
title.51 Acquiescence has been described as the "inaction of a state
which is faced with a situation constituting a threat to or infringe-
45. The International Court of Justice in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case,
held that Norway was entitled historical rights to a group of bays based on "the imme-
morial character of the claims" and by the "very ancient and peaceful usage" of the
waters. Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries, 1951 I.C.J. at 155.
46. The French assert exclusive control over the Bay of Cancale (or Granville
Bay) basing their claim on the exploitation of its oyster fisheries over a long period of
time. The Treaties of 1839 and 1867 between Great Britain and France recognized the
fisheries as within the complete domain and control of the Franch. See P. JESSup, supra
note 26, at 385-86.
47. The Indian High Court in Annakumaru Pillai v. Muthupayal, 27 Indian L.
R. 551 (Madras 1903), upheld the sovereign's claim to title over maritime territory off
the Ramad coast based on historical evidence of marine resource exploitation dating to
the 9th century. For an analysis of this decision, see P. JEssup, supra note 26, at 14-16.
48. On October 28, 1862, the American vessel Alleghanian, with a cargo of Peru-
vian guano was set on fire and sunk by confederate forces in Chesapeake Bay. In 1885,
the Second Court of Commissioners of Alabama Claims, held that the Bay was internal
waters of the United States when the questions of jurisdiction was considered. In finding
the element of continuity, the court stated that "from the earliest history of the country
it [Chesapeake Bay] has been claimed to be territorial waters, and the claim has never
been questioned." See I J.B. MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 741-42 (1906); P.
JESSUP, supra note 26, at 388-91.
49. Scelle stated that the period of prescription "is indeterminate and must in
each case be submitted to the test of reasonableness." 2 G. SCELLE, DROIT INTERNA-
TIONAL PUBLIC 435 (1946-1947), quoted and translated in Memorandum by the Secre-
tariat supra note 40, at 35.
50. I.C.J. Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents, Fisheries Case (United King-
dom v. Norway), Judgment of Dec. 18, 1951, vol. 1, Counter-memorial of Norway, at
452.
51. See Juridical Regime, supra note 41, at 16.
ment of its rights. ' 52 Acquiescence may also mean that foreign gov-
ernments "have simply been inactive." 53 By contrast, in order to pre-
vent historic title, foreign governments must protest the claimant
nation's assertions of sovereignty. Professor Bourquin illustrates the
relationship between acquiescence and protest, stating: "if their reac-
tions prevent the peaceful and continuous exercise of sovereignty, no
historic title can be formed. ' 54 In Bourquin's view, the opposition to
the claim must be effective.
Historic claims are often asserted on the basis of economic neces-
sity, national security, or other "vital interests" of the coastal sover-
eign asserting control. 5 While vital interests may logically support
the establishment of a maritime protection zone, an assertion of his-
toric bay based upon vital interests alone completely disregards the
historical time elements otherwise required to perfect the claim. Pro-
fessor Bourquin opposed any reference to vital interests when apply-
ing the doctrine of historic bays. He argued:
[W]hy should this factor be considered strictly within the context of "his-
toric title"? However widely the concept of a "historic title" is construed,
surely it cannot be claimed in circumstances where the historic claim is
absent. The "historic title" is one thing; the "vital interest" is another.5"
Professor Bourquin's point is well taken. Historic title is a process
which requires both the passage of time and the continuous assertion
of sovereignty. Historical evidence can only derive its shape and sub-
stance over time. By recognizing historic title on the basis of national
defense or economic necessity, the doctrine of historic bays is di-
luted. Claims based upon vital interests alone subject the practice of
delimitation to fabrication and abuse. 57
Classic examples of historic bays include the Sea of Azov, 58 the
52. MacGibbon, The Scope of Acquiescence in International Law, 1954 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 143.
53. Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice:
1951-54, 1953 BRIT. Y. B. INT'L L. 1, 29.
54. M. BOURQUIN, supra note 43, at 46; Juridical Regime, supra note 41, at 9.
55. See Juridical Regime, supra note 41, at 19. The concept of vital interests
encompasses a potpourri of interests important to the claimant state. The coastal state
may have a number of interests at stake, including but not limited to: demographic fac-
tors, customs and traditions, military position and defense requirements, resource con-
sumption and needs, and economic infrastructure.
56. M. BOURQUIN, supra note 43, at 51; Juridical Regime, supra note 41, at 20.
57. Goldie, Historic Bays in International Law: An Impressionistic Overview, 11
SYR. J. INT'L L. & COMM. 211, 229 (1985). The author suggests:
Before focusing attention onto historic bays for the protection of vital interests,
policy makers might do well to remember that there are other and possibly
more functional concepts available for the protection of vital interests without
making a fiction of history or a distortion of the past.
58. The Sea of Azov is situated within the southern territory of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, and is ten miles wide across the entrance. See Memorandum
by the Secretariat, supra note 40, at 3; P. Jssup, supra note 26, at 383.
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Bay of Chaleur,59 and Delaware Bay;60 their status is generally ac-
cepted by the international community of nations.61 Disputed exam-
ples of historic bays, on the other hand, include Peter the Great
Bay, 2 Rio de la Plata, 3 Hudson Bay,64 and the Gulf of Sidra (or
Sitre).65 Most of the disputed historic bays involve vast areas of in-
ternational waters. The United States has traditionally questioned
the application of the doctrine, especially when delimitation encum-
bers the breadth of the territorial sea and fisheries zones.For example, on October 10, 1973, Libya proclaimed the Gulf of
Sidra an historic bay asserting exclusive jurisdiction over all waters
within a 300-mile closing line. 6 In 1981, after a series of formal
protests, the United States ignored Libyan sovereignty and con-
ducted military maneuvers in the contested area. This confrontation
59. The Bay of Chaleur is situated between the Canadian Provinces of Quebec
and New Brunswick and is less than 12 miles in width at its entrance. The Supreme
Court of Canada declared the bay within the complete dominion and control of Canada.
Mowat v. McFee, 5 S.C.R. 66 (1880). Canadian sovereignty over this bay was accepted
by the United States in Article 2 of the Treaty of 20 July 1912.
60. The Delaware Bay is about 10 miles wide at the entrance and is situated
between the States of Delaware and New Jersey. In 1793, the French frigate
L'Embuscade seized the British vessel Grange inside the bay. When jurisdiction of the
waters was questioned, the United States declared historic title to the Bay. The Grange
was subsequently released and both France and Great Britain accepted United States
sovereignty over the waters. For a discussion of this incident, see J.B. MOORE, supra note
48, at 735-39, and P. JESSUP, supra note 26, at 395-97.
61. See generally Memorandum by the Secretariat, supra note 40 at 11-47.
62. The Soviet Union on July 20, 1957, declared historic title to the Bay of Peter
the Great adjoining the Sea of Japan. The closing line of this water area is 108 miles in
length. The consequence of this declaration is that the consent of Russian authorities is
required to navigate in this bay. The United States, France, Sweden, United Kingdom,
Holland, Germany and Japan protested. This protest illustrates that the acquiescence of
foreign nations, an essential element of historic title, was absent. For the United States
protest over the Soviet Union's decree, see 37 DEP'T ST. BULL. 588 (1957), and 38 DEP'T
ST. BULL. 461 (1958).
63. In 1961 Uraguay and Argentina enclosed the estuary of the Rio de ]a Plata.
The distance between the headlands is about 120 miles, while the penetration into the
land is 160 miles. The United States and the United Kingdom protested, claiming the
enclosure is not justified by the Territorial Sea Convention. See L. BOUCHEZ, supra note
40, at 164-67.
64. The Hudson Bay in northeastern Canada is approximately 900 miles in length
with a maximum width of 520 miles. In 1906, the Canadian Parliament passed a fishing
regulation which, in effect, declared the Hudson Bay as internal waters for Canada. See
4 Whiteman, supra note 20, at 236-37; P. JEssuP, supra note 26, at 411-12; L. BOUCHEZ,
supra note 41, at 239.
65. See infra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
66. For an analysis of this issue, see Sinnato, Historic and Vital Bays: An Analy-
sis of Libya's Claim to the Gulf of the Sitre, 13 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. J. 65 (1983),
and Francioni, The Statute of the Gulf of Sitre in International Law, 11 SYR. J. INT'L L.
& CoMm. 311 (1984).
resulted in the downing of two Libyan planes by United States Navy
jet fighters.67 In March of 1986, the Sixth Fleet again conducted
military maneuvers in the Gulf of Sidra. When the United States
entered the contested area, crossing Colonel Qaddafi's "line of
death,"6 8 Libya fired six Soviet-built SAM-5 surface-to-air missiles
at American aircraft. 9 The United States retaliated by destroying
two missile patrol boats and disabling a missile radar facility.70 The
United States suffered no casualties or property damage and ended
the exercises shortly after the incident. 1
History of the Doctrine
The doctrine of historic bays was first recognized as an established
category of international law in the North Atlantic Fisheries Arbi-
tration of 1910.72 The doctrine has been extensively addressed by
international legal scholars73 and is the subject of two United Na-
tions studies.7 4 Nonetheless, numerous efforts to codify a definition
have proved unsuccessful.7 5 Much of the disagreement between na-
67. Under the Reagan Administration, United States policy has been to question
all unacceptable historic claims. After giving a proper "Notice to Mariners" that mili-
tary exercises would take place in the Gulf, the Sixth Fleet entered the contested area.
During the exercise, Libyan aircraft approached the fleet approximately seventy-two
times. With orders to shoot if fired upon, two United States F-14's downed two Soviet-
built Libyan SU-22's over the ocean, approximately sixty miles from the coast of Libya.
See Statements of the Department of State of August 19, 1981, in 81 DEP'T ST. BULL.
57-62 (1981).
68. The "line of death" is parallel 32.30 and is the closing line used by Libya to
mark its territorial boundary. Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger conceded that
the maneuvers in the gulf were conducted as "freedom-of-navigation" exercises. Wein-
berger stated:
Being a global power gives us certain responsibilities to ensure navigation
rights and freedoms - not just for the United States, but for flag vessels of all
nations, and not only in the Gulf of Sidra but through the Strait of Hormuz or
any other sea-lanes that have been threatened with interdiction.
L.A. Times, Mar. 30, 1986, § V, at 5, col. 1.
69. N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1986, at 8, col. 1.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. United States v. Great Britain, The Hague Arbitration Cases 134 (1915).
73. See supra note 40.
74. The first study, Memorandum by the Secretariat, supra note 40, consists of
materials prepared and submitted to the First Conference on the Law of the Sea. The
second study, Juridical Regime, supra note 41, consists of materials prepared after the
conference when a definition could not be agreed upon.
75. Three United Nations Conferences on the Law of the Sea have been held.
The First Conference took place in Geneva in 1958. It is regarded as the most successful
conference because it was instrumental in adopting four of the most important Law of
the Sea Conventions, including: the Territorial Sea Convention, the Convention on the
High Seas, the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources of the High
Seas, and the Convention on the Continental Shelf. The Second Conference took place in
Geneva in 1960. This Conference reached no significant agreements on Law of the Sea
topics. The third Conference took place in New York, Caracas, Geneva and Jamaica
between December 3, 1973, and December 10, 1982. This Conference was successful in
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tions is undoubtedly based upon political rivalries and potential em-
barrassment for past delimitation actions. 8 This is illustrated by the
Peter the Great Bay incident.7 7 During a discussion on historic bays
at the First Conference on the Law of the Sea, Japan proposed a
definition similar to customary international standards.78 The Japa-
nese delegate, referring directly to the Soviet Union, argued:
In the past, there have actually been a number of cases where a state has
claimed vast sea areas as territorial, on the pretext of historic bays, without
the slightest historic elements whatsoever. In order to avoid recurrence of
such claims, it is essential that a definition of historic bays should be pro-
vided for in the article.79
The committee rejected the proposal on the basis of incomplete in-
formation on the subject, and initiated a study to examine the doc-
trine further.80
Though there was much discussion at several committee hearings,
the Second"' and Third8 2 Conferences on the Law of the Sea also
failed to adopt a suitable definition of historic bays. This lack of con-
formulating a number of successful programs dealing with the preservation and conserva-
tion of subsurface resources. See infra notes 166-70 and accompanying text. Nonetheless,
all three conferences failed to codify a definition of historic bays. For a review of the
codification efforts, see Goldie, supra note 57, at 214-20.
, 76. It cannot be expected that a state will accept rules which would possibly de-
prive them of considerable maritime areas to which they allegedly had sovereignty.
77. See supra note 62. Japan consistently argued that the historical evidence was
weak and the drawing of a 108-mile closing line was primarily for economic and defense
purposes. See Oda, Japan and the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 3
JAP. ANN. INT'L L. 65, 72 (1959); Takano, The Territorial Problems between Japan and
the Soviet Union, 3 JAP. ANN. INT'L L. 52 (1959).
78. The Japanese delegate proposed the following definition of "historic bays" to
be included in article 7 of the Territorial Sea Convention: "The term 'historic bays'
means those bays over which coastal State or States have effectively exercised sovereign
rights continuously for a period of long standing, with explicit or implicit recognition of
such practice by foreign States." The Japanese, more importantly, felt that the definition
of the term should not be left to any court or tribunal. The definition of historic bays,
argued the Japanese, was part of the task of codification for the Conference. U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 13/C. I/L. 104 (1958).
79. See U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/39, at 145.
80. See Juridical Regime, supra note 41. Mr. Rubio, the representative of Pan-
ama, proposed that the First Committee organize a subcommittee to examine the prob-
lem of bays, and in particular the legal status of historic bays. Mr. Rubio stated that it is
essential that the international instruments to be drafted by the Conference
should deal with such questions as the definition of historic bays, the rights of
the coastal state or States, the procedure for declaring a bay historic, the con-
ditions for recognition by other states, and the peaceful settlement of disputes
arising from objections by other states.
Official Records of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Vol. III, 1st
Comm., p.2.
81. See supra note 75.
82. Id.
sensus indicates the political complexities of the doctrine. Further it
suggests the impossibility of formulating and applying general prin-
ciples of law to the unique and particular characteristics of each bay
in question. It is uncertain whether a single definition can ever be
codified that considers the political, historical, and geographical pe-
culiarities of the different regions of the world.
83
DOMESTIC APPLICATION
The Submerged Lands Act3 4 was enacted in 1953. In enacting the
SLA, Congress granted to each coastal state all subsoil and subsur-
faces resources three miles seaward from its coastline. The SLA de-
fines the term coastline as "the line of ordinary low water along that
portion of the coast which is in direct contact with the open sea and
the line marking the seaward limit of inland waters."85 The SLA,
however, does not define "inland waters." Consequently, the Su-
preme Court has adopted the definition of inland waters contained in
article 7 of the Territorial Sea Convention for the purposes of the
SLA.88 The Court adopted article 7 in its entirety, including para-
graph 6 which acknowledges the doctrine of historic bays as an ex-
ception to the general rules on the delimitation of bays. 7
83. Discussing the complexities of codification, De Visscher noted:
Proven long use, which is the [historic bays] foundation, merely represents a
complex of interests and relations which in themselves have the effect of at-
taching a territory or an expanse of sea to a given state. It is these interests and
relations, varying from one case to another, and not the passage of a fixed
term, unknown in any event to international law, that are taken into direct
account by the judge to decide in concerto on the existence or nonexistence of a
consolidation by historic titles.
C. DE VISSCHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 200 (1957).
84. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (1982). See supra note 4.
85. 43 U.S.C. § 1301(c). Low-water mark is the intersection of the plane of aver-
age low tide with the shore. The plane of average low tide serves as the mean or refer-
ence from which the depth of water is indicated on nautical charts. See A. SHALOWITZ,
supra note 18, at 97-99. The Supreme Court in the Texas Boundary Case held that the
term "coast line" means the modern, ambulatory coastline of Texas and not the 1845
coast line that over the years has eroded. 394 U.S. 1 (1969). Moreover, the Court in
United States v. California stated that, "[tihe coast line is to be taken as heretofore or
heretoafter modified by natural means ..... 382 U.S. 449 (1966). (Supplemental
Decree).
86. The Court, in United States v. California, stated:
Congress, in passing the Act, left the responsibility for defining inland waters
to this Court. We think that it did not tie our hands at the same time. Had
Congress wished us simply to rubber-stamp the statements of the State Depart-
ment as to its policy in 1953, it could readily have done so itself. It is our
opinion that we best fill our responsibility of giving content to the words which
Congress employed by adopting the best and most workable definitions availa-
ble. The Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, approved by
the Senate and ratified by the President, provides such definitions. We adopt
them for purposes of the Submerged Lands Act.
381 U.S. at 164-65 (second California decision).
87. See Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 29, art. 7.
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In adopting the doctrine of historic bays, the Court accepted the
general view that the three essential elements, discussed above,88 are
required. The Court, however, imposed three modifications to tailor
application of the doctrine to federal-state disputes over submerged
lands. First, the claim of historic bay status is to be treated as if it
were asserted by the federal government and opposed by foreign na-
tions.89 The Court stated:
The [Territorial Sea] Convention was, of course, designed with an eye to
affairs between nations rather than to domestic disputes... [I]t would be
inequitable in adapting the principles of international law to the resolution
of a domestic controversy, to permit the National Government to distort
those principles, in the name of its power over foreign relations and external
affairs, by denying any effect to past events. The only fair way to apply the
convention's recognition of historic bays to this case, then, is to treat the
claim of historic waters as if it were being made by the national sovereign
and opposed by another nation.90
The second modification requires that both state and federal activ-
ities and assertions of sovereignty against foreign nations be consid-
ered in applying the doctrine.91 Factors to be given weight include:
the extent foreign vessels are excluded from the disputed waters; the
extent foreign vessels are subject to legislation or regulations; and
the continuous enforcement of regulations which pertain to the
area.9 2 It does not matter whether these factors are asserted by the
federal or state governments, or both.
Third, the Court considers a "disclaimer"'93 by the federal govern-
ment decisive unless the claimant state establishes historic evidence
that is "clear beyond doubt" and which has "already ripened be-
cause of past events." 94 In all submerged lands cases, the United
States essentially disclaims all state assertions that the maritime ar-
eas in question are historic waters. However, the Court recognized
that in those cases where conclusive proof of historic title was pre-
sent, permitting the federal government's disclaimer would approach
an "impermissible contraction of territory." 95 The states, nonethe-
less, must clearly beyond doubt prove historic title in order to over-
88. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. See also Louisiana Boundary
Case, 394 U.S. at 23-24 n.27.
89. See Louisiana Boundary Case, 394 U.S. at 77.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 77-78.
92. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
93. A "disclaimer" by the United States is a repudiation and a denial by the
federal government that a disputed maritime area is historic waters or a historic bay.
94. Louisiana Boundary Case, 394 U.S. at 77.
95. Id. n. 104.
ride the disclaimer of the federal government.
In not one case prior to the Alabama and Mississippi Boundary
Case, had the Court found sufficient evidence of historic title to sat-
isfy the "clear beyond doubt" standard of proof.96 For example, in
the Louisiana Boundary Case,97 the Court held that state laws and
regulations relating to transportation and navigation were insufficient
exercises of dominion to perfect a claim to historic inland waters. 8
Because article 17 of the Territorial Sea Convention9" permits the
innocent passage of foreign vessels, a characteristic typically associ-
ated with territorial seas rather than inland waters, the Court found
the state's exercise of authority not commensurate in scope with the
nature of the title claimed.100 In United States v. Alaska,'0' the en-
forcement of fish and wildlife regulations was also considered an in-
sufficient exercise of sovereignty. 102 The exercise of sovereignty, rea-
soned the Court, must be an assertion of power to exclude all foreign
vessels and navigation.0 3 In United States v. Florida,T the Special
Master found that the State of Florida had failed to satisfy this bur-
den of proof,10 5 stating: "[it] seems clear from the evidence that the
State of Florida has never, before or since 1968, seized a foreign
vessel in the disputed area beyond the three-league limit for violating
its law."' 06 The Court, accepting the reasoning of the Special
Master, simply concluded that there were no historic bays on the
coast of Florida.
0 7
With respect to the acquiescence requirement, the Court requires
something more than a mere failure to protest; foreign governments
must first be given actual or constructive notice of the sovereign's
claim. In United States v. Alaska, 08 Justice Blackmum stated:
96. In United States v. Alaska, however, the District Court and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held for the State of Alaska contending the
evidence was conclusive. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower courts.
352 F. Supp. 815 (1972), aff'd per curiam, 497 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 422
U.S. 184 (1975).
97. 394 U.S. 11 (1969).
98. Id.
99. Article 17 of the Territorial Sea Convention states: Foreign ships exercising
the right of innocent passage shall comply with the laws and regulations enacted by the
coastal State in conformity with these articles and other rules of international law and, in
particular, with such laws and regulations relating to transport and navigation. Territo-
rial Sea Convention, supra note 29, art. 17.
100. See Louisiana Boundary Case, 394 U.S. at 24-26.
101. 422 U.S. 184 (1975).
102. Id. at 197.
103. Id. at 197-200.
104. 425 U.S. 791 (1976).
105. See United States v. Florida, Report of Albert E. Mars, Special Master.
April 9, 1974 (October Term 1974, No. 52 Original).
106. Id. at 45.
107. United States v. Florida, 425 U.S. 791 (1976).
108. 422 U.S. 184, 200 (1975).
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"[t]he failure to protest is meaningless unless it is shown that the
governments of those countries knew or reasonably should have
known of the authority asserted."' 09
In sum, the Supreme Court recognizes and applies the three essen-
tial elements required to establish historic title, subject to three mod-
ifications in applying the doctrine to domestic disputes. There must
be an open, notorious and effective exercise of sovereignty, exercised
for a sufficient period of time to establish usage, and done so with
the acquiescence of foreign nations. The activities of both the state
and federal governments are to be taken into consideration, and
viewed as if the claim is between the federal government and foreign
nations. The exercise of authority, according to the Court, must be
an assertion of power to exclude all foreign navigation. Furthermore,
the historical evidence presented by the state must be clear beyond
doubt to override the inevitable disclaimer of the federal
government.
Alabama and Mississippi Boundary Case
In the Alabama and Mississippi Boundary Case, the Special
Master's recommendation characterized Mississippi Sound as both a
juridical and an historic bay, under article 7 of the Territorial Sea
Convention." The Special Master found the Sound met both the
semicircle test and the twenty-four mile closing-line rule of article 7,
thus, qualifying it as a juridical bay."" The United States filed ex-
ceptions to the Master's findings opposing both the juridical bay and
historic bay determinations." 2 Alabama and Mississippi also filed
exceptions to the Master's report claiming that alternative grounds
for delimiting the Sound were available. 13 The Court, nonetheless,
109. Id.
110. See Report of the Special Master, supra note 15.
111. Id. at 12-18. In reaching the juridical bay conclusion, the Special Master first
determined that Dauphin Island was an extension of the mainland. The basis for this
conclusion is the depth and utility of the intervening waters and the short distance be-
tween the Island and the mainland. By treating Dauphin Island in this manner, the
Master concluded that water gaps between the barrier islands was less than the 24-mile
maximum of article 7 of the Territorial Sea Convention. Counsel for the United States
protested this determination, stating sarcastically: "[T]he Master's reasoning is flawed in
that he mistakenly treated water as land because it was inland." See United States v.
Louisiana, Exceptions of the United States and Supporting Brief 8, June 25, 1984 (Octo-
ber Term, 1984 No. 9 Original) [hereinafter referred to as Exceptions of the United
States and Supporting Brief].
112. See generally Exceptions of the United States and Supporting Brief, supra
note I 11.
113. See generally Exceptions of the State of Mississippi, supra note 16; Excep-
ignored the Special Master's juridical bay findings as well as the
exceptions introduced by the parties, and based its conclusion on the
doctrine of historic bays."1 4 The Court held in favor of the States of
Alabama and Mississippi, granting them paramount title to the Mis-
sissippi Sound.
The Court, following the modifications outlined in the Louisiana
Boundary Case,"15 held that development of the Sound for intracoas-
tal waterway purposes,11e construction of a military fortification,"1
7
erection of a lighthouse, a8 and a statement in a 1906 case that the
Sound is "an inclosed arm of the sea," 1 9 were activities sufficient to
assert exclusive jurisdiction over the disputed waters.' 20 The Court
found that this evidence, in effect, put foreign nations on notice that
the Sound was deemed inland waters by both the state and federal
governments, and that there was effective and continuous exercise of
sovereignty over the disputed waters.
The United States questioned the viability of the historic evidence
used by the Court, arguing, for example, that Fort Massachusetts on
Ship Island was constructed primarily to suppress the civil insurrec-
tion, not to exclude foreign navigation.' 21 They also argued that con-
struction and maintenance of a military installation was, in itself,
inconclusive evidence to prove that the United States was exercising
sovereignty over adjoining waters. 22 Referring to the federal govern-
ment's Naval bases in Cuba and the Azores, counsel for the United
States commented: "Surely it cannot be suggested that continuous
maintenance to these [overseas military] installations transforms all
the intervening water into our historic bays.' 23 More importantly,
the United States argued that because the uncompleted fort was
tions of the State of Alabama, supra note 16. The States contended that their Acts of
Admissions established their maritime boundaries south of the barrier islands; that arti-
cle 4 of the Territorial Sea Convention is applicable to delimit the Sound; and that the
Sound qualifies as a juridical bay without treating Dauphin Island as part of the
mainland.
114. Alabama and Mississippi Boundary Case, 105 S. Ct. 1074, 1087 (1985).
115. 394 U.S. 11 (1969). See supra notes 88-95.
116. 105 S. Ct. 1074, 1081. The House of Representatives on February 8, 1817,
initiated a project to develop the Sound for intracoastal waterway purposes. H.R. Doc.
No. 427, 14th Cong., 2d Sess. (1817).
117. Id. at 1081-82. The War Department in 1858 authorized and constructed a
fort on the west end of Ship Island. See Caraway, The Story of Ship Island, 4 J. Miss.
His. 76, 80-81 (1942).
118. 105 S. Ct. at 1083. The federal government, in 1879, constructed a lighthouse
on the central section of Ship Island. See Caraway, supra note 117, at 81.
119. Alabama and Mississippi Boundary Case, 105 S.Ct. at 1083, citing Louisi-
ana v. Mississippi, 202 U.S. 1, 48 (1906).
120. Alabama and Mississippi Boundary Case, 105 S. Ct. at 1087.
121. Id. at 1082 n.6.
122. See Exceptions of the United States and Supporting Brief, supra note 111, at
29.
123. Id. at 29 n.10.
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abandoned fifteen years after construction began, any claims to the
Mississippi Sound as inland waters ceased to exist.
124
The United States also argued that the language in Louisiana v.
Mississippi, a 1906 lateral-boundary dispute case between those two
states, characterizing the Sound as "an inclosed arm of the sea,"
failed to establish Mississippi Sound as "inland waters.' 25 The
United States reasoned that it could not be bound by the ruling since
it was not a party to the litigation.126 Moreover, the United States
contended that the decision could not be used as evidence because
the Court twice dismissed the case as having no bearing on federal-
state disputes over submerged lands.12
7
The Court retreated from its previous decisions regarding the ex-
tent of authority necessary to establish sovereignty, 28 rejecting the
United States contention that exclusion of foreign navigation from
the disputed waters was required to prove historic bay status. The
United States argued that the evidence was weak compared to that
presented by the States of California, Louisiana, and Alaska in pre-
vious litigation; in those cases, it was shown that foreign fishermen
were arrested. 29 The United States claimed that "the Master disre-
garded the very heavy burden resting on the proponents of such a
claim" and that the evidence "does not remotely show that, at any
time during American sovereignty, the exclusion of peaceful foreign
vessels was attempted, much less accomplished in such a notorious
way, and for such a substantial period, as to ripen into an accepted
usage." 30 The Court, nonetheless, stated that concrete action to en-
force the laws of a state was not the only mode of asserting sover-
eignty; the assertion of power or the exercise of effective sovereignty
is possible through less extreme types of action. 131 This rationale,
124. Id. at 28.
125. Id. at 29-30.
126. Id. at 30.
127. Id.; see also United States v. California, 332 U.S. at 37 (first California deci-
sion); Texas Boundary Case, 363 U.S. at 70.
128. Alabama and Mississippi Boundary Case, 105 S. Ct. at 1086.
129. See United States v. California, 381 U.S. at 174-75; United States v. Alaska,
422 U.S. at 201-02.
130. See Exceptions of the United States and Supporting Brief, supra note 111, at
5.
131. Alabama and Mississippi Boundary Case, 105 S. Ct. at 1086-87. The Court
advocated a flexible approach to appraising historical evidence stating:
[T]he 1962 United Nations study of historic waters notes that the requirement
of effective exercise of sovereignty over the area by the appropriate action on
the part of the claimant state "does not, however, imply that the State necessa-
rily must have undertaken concrete action to enforce its relevant laws and reg-
however, contradicts the requirement established in United States v,
Florida that a "ship must be seized." '132
The Court also invalidated the United States disclaimer of the
Sound as inland waters. 13 3 The Special Master reasoned that the dis-
claimer, simply a set of maps published by the federal government
delineating certain waters, was nothing more than a tactic used to
prevent the recognition of a legitimate historic claim.134
Responding to the Court's finding that no foreign government has
ever challenged the inland water status of the Sound, the United
States argued that more than a failure to protest was required to
establish acquiescence by foreign nations. 35 Despite the United
States contention that no foreign nation could have reasonably con-
strued the federal. government's activities as asserting inland water
rights to the Mississippi Sound,136 the Court reasoned that the
United States "publicly and equivocally" asserted sovereignty over
the Sound, and that foreign nations had reasonable notice of the
claim, acquiescing to United States sovereignty over the disputed
waters. 1
3 7
In finding Mississippi Sound an historic bay, the Court gave sub-
stantial weight to the concept of vital interests in reaching its conclu-
sion. Such factors as defense needs, economic interests, and geo-
graphical configuration were all considered by the Court. Justice
Blackmun stated that: "The historic importance of Mississippi
Sound to vital interests of the United States, and the corresponding
insignificance of the Sound to the interests of foreign nations [as an
international waterway] lend support to the view that Mississippi
Sound constitutes inland waters.' 38 The concept of vital interests,
however, is not recognized in international law and has been scruti-
nized as a contradiction to the doctrine of historic bays."3 9
ulations within or with respect to the area claimed. It is not impossible that
these laws and regulations were respected without the State having to resort to
particular acts of enforcement. It is, however, essential that, to the extent that
action on the part of the State and its organs was necessary to maintain au-
thority over the area, such action was undertaken.
Alabama and Mississippi Boundary Case, 105 S. Ct. at 1087 (citing Juridical Regime,
supra note 41, at 43).
132. 425 U.S. at 791. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
133. Alabama and Mississippi Boundary Case, 105 S. Ct. at 1085-86.
134. The publication of these maps in 1971 by the U.S. State Department was in
response to domestic and foreign demand for documents delimiting the boundaries of the
United States.
135. See Exceptions of the United States and Supporting Brief, supra note I 11, at
21.
136. Id. at 33.
137. Alabama and Mississippi Boundary Case, 105 S. Ct. at 1085.
138. Id. at 1081.
139. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
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IMPLICATIONS
There are a number of problems with the Court's formula for in-
land waters as applied in the Alabama and Mississippi Boundary
Case. First, the application of the doctrine of historic bays, a princi-
ple of ownership based upon acquisitive prescription, has always
been controversial in international law. Second, the Court misapplies
the doctrine of historic bays by referring to certain vital interests as
elements for consideration. Third, by modifying the doctrine for the
purpose of domestic submerged lands disputes, the complexity of evi-
dentiary considerations increases substantially. Finally, by develop-
ing a formula with potential foreign relations repercussions, the
Court interferes with the power of the executive branch.
Prescriptive Rights and Historical Evidence
The doctrine of historic bays is based upon the principle of acquis-
itive prescription. 140 The elements of prescriptive rights, particularly
those requiring the effectiveness and continuity of the claim, are dif-
ficult to measure. Consequently, the substance and validity of histor-
ical evidence is often dependent upon the perspective of the histo-
rian. The historian's examination and description of the past is
significantly influenced by present political and social realities. The
validity of historical evidence hinges upon a number of subjective
issues. For example, what constitutes an effective exercise of author-
ity? Does failure to continually exercise authority destroy the claim?
How long must the claim be in effect before title ripens? The re-
sponses of the claimant nation to these questions are usually self-
serving. To deny this phenomena would ignore geopolitical realities.
Such subjectivity renders the doctrine susceptible to misapplication
and abuse. Thus, the common interests of the world community are
compromised when a body of water is delimited without sufficient
historical evidence.
Concept of Vital Interests
In reaching its conclusion, the Court reviewed the "vital interests"
of the federal government, in applying the doctrine of historic
bays."4 Consideration of vital interests, however, undermines the
time requirement of the doctrine. Delimitation of historic bays on
140. See Johnson, Acquisitive Prescription in International Law, 1951 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 332.
141. 105 S. Ct. at 1081.
the basis of vital interests has been the subject of many international
disputes. Libya and the USSR, for example, have claimed historic
title to vast bodies of water based upon economic and defense consid-
erations.1 42 However, the concept of vital interests is not recognized
in international law; reliance upon economic and defense interests in
applying the doctrine of historic bays increases the potential for
abuse and international conflict. Furthermore, judicial pronounce-
ments which rely upon vital interests in the practice of delimitation
interfere with American diplomacy, requiring the executive branch
to accept assertions of sovereignty based upon economic and defense
considerations.
Domestic Evidentiary Considerations
In analyzing domestic submerged lands disputes between a state
and the federal government, the Court modifies the doctrine of his-
toric bays-it considers both federal and state exercises of authority
and views the claim as if made by the federal government and op-
posed by foreign nations. These modifications substantially increase
the complexity of evidentiary considerations.
The Court's modifications are unworkable where the exercise of
authority by a state contradicts that of the federal government.
There can be no "effective and continual exercise of sovereignty"
when the state and federal governments have each asserted control
over the disputed waters. For example, during the Civil War, the
fort on Ship Island was stormed and occupied by the Confederates
for a period of three months. 43 The insurgents manned and armed
the garrison on behalf of the Confederate States of America. This
assertion of sovereignty by the rebels disrupted United States control
over the disputed waters, destroying the continuity of a United
States claim.
A recent incident in Alaska also illustrates the difficulty of the
Court's modifications when state and federal interests conflict. In
early 1962, a Japanese fishing fleet entered Cook Inlet, a body of
water claimed by the State of Alaska as inland waters based on his-
toric rights.' Alaska officials requested that the federal government
take action. The federal government, however, did nothing. On April
15, 1962, Alaska law enforcement officials arrested the fleet's cap-
tains and charged them with violating state fishing regulations. 45
Subsequently, the State of Alaska settled the matter with the Japa-
nese company. Japan, in the meantime, protested the incident. The
142. See supra notes 62 & 65 and accompanying text.
143. See Caraway, supra note 117, at 80-81.
144. See United States v. Alaska, 422 U.S. 184, 201 (1975).
145. Id. at 201-02.
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United States took no formal position on the issue and declined to
support Alaska's assertion of sovereignty.14 This lack of support, in
effect, illustrates the United States dissatisfaction with Alaska's ex-
ercise of authority. The state and federal governments had opposing
views regarding the scope of authority of each entity. Where there
are inconsistant assertions of sovereignty by the federal and state
governments, the Court's modifications are difficult, if not unwork-
able, to apply.
Separation of Powers Considerations
The Executive Branch has consistently challenged the applicability
of the doctrine of historic bays and the Territorial Sea Convention to
domestic disputes. 47 It contends that when the SLA was enacted,
there was no definition of inland waters in the international commu-
nity. 48 The original draft of the SLA defined inland waters as in-
cluding "all estuaries, ports, harbors, bays, channels, straits, historic
bays, and sounds, and all other bodies of water which join the
sea."' 49 Congress, however, ultimately complied with a State Depart-
ment request to forgo a legislative definition to avoid future foreign
relations problems.' 50 When the language was struck from the origi-
nal draft, Senator Cordon, the acting chairman of the Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs, remarked: "[I]n our attempts to take
care of a purely domestic matter we might be putting the United
States on record with a precedent which we intended only to apply
domestically but which might be applied internationally.' 15' Simi-
larly, to promote United States interests in foreign relations, the
Court must abide by Executive Branch policy.' 52 Judicial interpreta-
tion of international law inconsistent with that of the Executive
Branch interferes with the federal government's ability to alter its
146. Id. at 202.
147. See United States v. California, 381 U.S. at 164; see also Reply Brief of the
United States, supra note 17, at 5.
148. See Reply Brief of the United States, supra note 17, at 4.
149. See United States v. California, 381 U.S. at 189-90 (Black, J., dissenting).
150. Id.
151. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs on
S.J. Res. 13 and other Bills, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1304 (1953) (statement of Sen. Cor-
don, acting chairman of the Committee on Insular Affairs).
152. "The conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the
Constitution to the Executive and Legislative - 'the political' - departments of the govern-
ment, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not
subject to judicial inquiry or decision." Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302
(1918).
position; such flexibility is an important tool in foreign policymaking.
Foreign nations frequently monitor United States Supreme Court
decisions and, despite their domestic nature, use them as negotiation
tactics.1 53 Thus, the State Department may have difficulty justifying
its interpretations of law when they differ from those of the Supreme
Court.
The delimitation of waters directly affects the territorial bounda-
ries of the United States. Such boundary issues are political ques-
tions154 properly decided by the executive or legislative branches of
the government, rather than the judiciary. Under the doctrine of sep-
aration of powers,1 55 the judiciary is obligated to exercise judicial
restraint and defer to the position of the executive branch on such
political issues. Supporting deference in the context of historic bay
determinations, the United States, in United States v. Alaska156
argued:
Who is the sovereign, de jure or de facto, of a territory is not a judicial, but
a political question, the determination of which by the legislative and execu-
tive departments of any government conclusively binds the judges, as well
as all other officers, citizens and subjects of that government. This principle
• . . has always been upheld by this court, and has been affirmed under a
great variety of circumstances.
157
The Court, however, has assumed that by enacting the SLA with-
out a definition of inland waters, Congress purposefully left the re-
153. Many authors believe that world public order is based on the logic of reci-
procity. In respect to this phenomena, Falk states that "[tlhe unreasonable national
claim prompts imitation and retaliation. If the Soviet Union restricts the travel of Ameri-
can diplomats then the United States will restrict the travel of Soviet diplomats. If the
United States claims sovereignty over its continental shelf then Argentina follows with a
parallel claim." See R. FALK, THE STATUS OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL SociETY 651
(1970).
154. The rationale of the political question doctrine is that certain issues are better
resolved by the political branches of the government rather than the judicial branch. The
Court in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962), outlined the criteria for determining
whether an issue is a political question or not. Justice Harlan writing for the majority
stated:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is
found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and man-
ageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the
impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expres-
sing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual
need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question.
155. The separation of powers argument is derived from the perspective that the
judicial branch should have a restricted governmental role and avoid interfering with the
political branches of the federal government. Hanoch Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic,
726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1354 (1985).
156. 422 U.S. 184 (1975).
157. See Post Trial Brief for Plaintiff at 21-23, United States v. Alaska, 352 F.
Supp. 815 (D. Alaska 1972) (citing Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890)).
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sponsibility for interpretation to the judiciary.158 Congressional re-
sponse to the Court's first California decision illustrates contrary
legislative intent.159 By passing the SLA Congress effectively over-
ruled the Court's 1947 holding in United States v. California,'60
which vested title to subsurface coastal resources exclusively in the
federal government. In his dissent, Justice Black highlights this ar-
gument, stating: "It seems to me the height of irony to hold that an
act passed expressly to escape the effect of this Court's opinion in
this field is now construed as leaving us free to announce principles
directly antithetic to the basic purpose of Congress of deciding that
question for itself once and for all."' 6'1 Nonetheless, the Court
adopted its own formula, modifying and applying international law
to define inland waters for the purposes of SLA application. Because
the political question involved has possible foreign relations repercus-




Congress should develop an exclusively domestic definition of in-
land waters for purposes of the SLA. The legislature is the only fo-
rum where both state and federal interests are adequately repre-
sented. The definition should consider the peculiar characteristics of
disputes involving domestic offshore submerged lands. More impor-
tantly, the definition should eliminate the doctrine of historic bays as
a method of acquiring title to inland waters. Past codification efforts,
both domestic and international, illustrate the difficulties inherent in
the doctrine. 62 State and federal interests would be better accommo-
158. See United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139, 164-65 (second California
decision).
159. See supra note 4.
160. 332 U.S. 19 (1947). See supra note 3.
161. California, 381 U.S. at 210 (second California decision).
162. The Court in Banco Nacional De Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428
(1963), noting the sensitivity of political question issues, observed:
[T]he degree of codification or consensus concerning a particular area of inter-
national law, the more appropriate it is for the judiciary to render decisions
regarding it, since the courts can then focus on the application of an agreed
principle to circumstances of fact rather than on the sensitive task of establish-
ing a principle not inconsistent with the national interest or with international
justice. It is also evident that some aspects of international law touch much
more sharply on national nerves than do others; the less important the implica-
tions of an issue are for our foreign relations, the weaker the justification for
dated by excluding a principle based on prescriptive rights as a mode
of adjudicating offshore submerged lands cases. The doctrine of his-
toric bays is simply an unmanageable legal standard. Thus, Congress
should develop a definition of inland waters which incorporates lan-
guage from articles 4163 and 7 of the Territorial Sea Convention,
64
because minus the doctrine of historic bays, articles 4 and 7 are rea-
sonable, and manageable, methodologies for delimiting maritime
areas.
International
The community of nations should eschew the doctrine of historic
bays as obsolete in modern international law. It is a doctrine danger-
ously susceptible to abuse and misapplication. This is especially true
with the increased reference to the concept of vital interests.
Codification is often the end of a long process of developing and
fine tuning legal standards. Internationally codified rules reflect sta-
bilized, customary international practice."6 The inability of the com-
munity of nations to agree on a general definition illustrates the un-
manageable nature of the doctrine. Thus, it can be realistically
concluded that the doctrine of historic bays neither supports nor re-
flects the mutual interests of the community of nations.
Furthermore, with the development of alternative methods of reg-
ulating maritime activities, the concerns of all interested nations are
protected. The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea"6 recognizes, for example, the Exclusive Economic Zone, 167 the
exclusivity in the political branches.
163. The Executive Branch, however, rejects the use of the straight baseline
method contained in article 4 and the Court consistently defers to this position. See Loui-
siana Boundary Case, 394 U.S. at 72-73; United States v. California, 381 U.S. at 167-
68.
164. See Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 29. See also supra notes 30 & 34.
165. See generally Lauterpacht, Codification and Development of International
Law, 49 Am. J. INT'L L. 16 (1955).
166. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, done December 10, 1982,
U.N. Doe. A/CONF. 62/122 (1982), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as LOS Convention]. The United States has refused to sign the LOS Convention
primarily because of its dissatisfaction with the deep seabed mining arrangements. 19
U.N. Chron. No. 6, 3, 16-17 (1982). See Larson, The Reagan Rejection of the U.N.
Convention, 14 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L. 337 (1985). The United States accepted, how-
ever, the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) as domestic law and also issued a policy state-
ment praising most parts of the LOS Convention as fairly balancing the interests of the
community of nations. See 83 DEP'T ST. BULL. 20 (1983); Peirce, Selective Adoption of
the New Law of the Sea: The United States Proclaims its Exclusive Economic Zone, 23
VA. J. INT'L L. 581 (1983). By December 9, 1984, 159 countries had signed the LOS
Convention. For a list of signatories, see U.N. Doe. A/39/647 at 37-41 (1984), and A/
39/647 Add.l at 1-2 (1984). See also Simmonds, The Status of the United Nation's
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982, 34 INT'L & ComP. L.Q. 359 (1985).
167. LOS Convention, supra note 166, art. 55-75. In the EEZ, a coastal state has
sovereign rights over the exploitation of subsurface resources, including fisheries, oil and
gas and other economic resources. The outer limits of the EEZ is 200 nautical miles from
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Contiguous Zone, 168 the Doctrine of Archipelagos,'169 and the Re-
gime of Islands,170 each allocating limited exclusive rights to the seas
and its resources. The doctrine of historic bays, however, defeats the
efforts of these programs. As an ad hoc exception, the doctrine of
historic bays permits a claimant nation to circumvent established
rules governing delimitation. Thus, the elimination of the doctrine
will avoid future polemic discussion over unsupported historic claims
and claims based upon self-serving vital interests.'
7 1
CONCLUSION
As international law, the doctrine of historic bays is problematic
at best. Moreover, the controversial nature of historic rights renders
the United States Supreme Court's modification and application of
the doctrine to domestic disputes even more questionable. After
three Conferences on the Law of the Sea, the community of nations
has yet to codify a workable and definitive article addressing the is-
sue. The lack of accord diminishes the validity and sensibility of this
doctrine. The unwillingness to codify the doctrine illustrates that it
does not reflect the mutual interests of the international community.
Nonetheless, the doctrine of historic bays, controversial and untrust-
the breadth of the territorial sea. See generally Ryan, The Exclusive Economic Zone,
OCEANUS, Winter 1984-1985, at 3.
168. LOS Convention, supra note 166, art. 33. In a zone contiguous to the territo-
rial sea, the coastal state may exercise control for infringement of its laws and regula-
tions relating to customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary matters. The outer limits of the
contiguous zone may not exceed beyond 24 nautical miles from the breadth of the terri-
torial sea. See Lowe, The Development of the Concept of the Contiguous Zone, 1981
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 109.
169. LOS Convention, supra note 166, arts. 46-54. The doctrine of archipelagic
baselines permits a archipelagic State to delimit its surrounding waters using a straight
baseline system.
170. Id. art. 121. The LOS Convention provides that the maritime limits of islands
that sustain human habitation, shall be measured in a fashion similar to other land
territory.
171. An historic claim of the archipelagic state of Tonga, for example, to an ex-
panse of approximately 150,000 square miles of the Pacific Ocean, will never arise. See
Statement of Mr. Tupoutoa (Tonga), reprinted in II Third United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea Official Records 107 (1974). Tonga's claim to its territorial sea
was based on the Royal Proclamation of King Tupou I in 1887. The 1887 decree referred
to four coordinates in the form of a rectangle covering a total area of sea and islands of
approximately 150,000 square miles. Tonga insisted this assertion was necessary to pro-
tect the territorial integrity and unity of its 150 islands. Tonga was, however, willing to
review its claim in order to accommodate the goals of the Conference. See also State-
ment of Mr. Tupoutoa, reprinted in I UNCLOS III Official Records 108-09 (1974).
worthy by international standards, has been adopted by the Court as
a viable principle of domestic law.
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